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Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies 
Irina D. Manta* 
 
Trademark bullying has become a persistent problem, with 
large companies intimidating smaller entities with cease and desist 
campaigns and achieving anti-competitive results.  A number of 
tactics exist to deal with bullying behavior.  One of them is the 
imposition of judicial sanctions, but the standards in that area are 
unclear and the defendants often do not have the financial means 
to engage in litigation at all.  Other, extralegal measures such as 
shaming have shown some success, but also present numerous 
drawbacks and prove insufficient when used against powerful 
actors.  This article proposes a new model that draws on the 
existing functions of the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) to stem 
the indiscriminate sending of cease and desist letters by large 
trademark holders and incentivizes them to file their claims with 
the PTO under certain conditions.  This solution seeks to guard the 
interests of legitimate victims of infringement while balancing their 
rights with the need to protect smaller entities from the threat of 
ruinous litigation.  If the PTO could make preliminary 
determinations about the validity of infringement claims, 
trademark owners could record evidence of policing while being 
discouraged from making frivolous claims. 
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Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Yale Law School, J.D.; Yale College, 
B.A.  I would like to thank James Barabas, Eric Goldman, Hugh Hansen, Brian Lee, 
Cassandra Robertson, Jeremy Sheff, David Silverman, Robert Wagner, and my research 
assistant David Gerard.  I am very grateful to Fordham Law School and the Fordham 
IPLJ for inviting me to make this contribution and thank the symposium participants for 
their comments.  My appreciation also goes to Brooklyn Law School and its staff for 
support during my research.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, the phenomenon of ―trademark bullying‖ 
has begun to receive more attention in legal scholarship and the 
media.  Simply stated, a trademark bully is usually a large 
company that seeks to put an end to behavior by individuals and 
small businesses that it perceives as a danger to its own intellectual 
property even though its legal claims against these other parties are 
spurious or non-existent.
1
  The bully puts its opponents under 
pressure through ―cease and desist‖ (C & D) letters in which it 
demands that the opponent stop using a certain trademark that it 
believes resembles its own and threatens legal sanctions if the C & 
D demands are not met.
2
  These letters frequently do not contain 
detailed explanations of the alleged infringement but instead are 
intended to intimidate recipients into submission through the use of 
vague claims masked in legalese and are sent by lawyers who 
pressure recipients into providing a fast response.
3
  Individuals and 
 
 1 There is some anecdotal evidence of individuals bullying other individuals in this 
manner, usually for purposes of extorting moderate sums of money as part of a 
settlement.  This piece will, however, mainly focus on the more typical Goliath-versus-
David kind of bullying. 
 2 See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 628–
29 (2011).  
 3 Id.; see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 66 (1998) (calling trademark 
infringement claims a ―ruse‖ that companies use to protect against competition).  
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small businesses often capitulate rather than face a harrowing legal 
battle that could bring them to the brink of financial destruction. 
Trademark bullying engenders a number of costs for society.  
First, the market suffers a reduction of legitimate competition.
4
  
The potential downsides of this effect are well-known and include 
consequences such as higher prices for products and a reduced 
panoply of choices in the marketplace.  Relatedly, bullies create 
obstacles for consumers' ability to make source-identification 
connections with products that said consumers may wish to 
purchase or that could benefit them.
5
  Second, bullying can 
seriously inhibit not only commercial but also non-commercial 
speech.  While individuals are supposed to be able to make fair use 
of trademarks, even fair use can at times encounter enforcement 
efforts by way of C & D letters.
6
  One such case was when the 
Lego Group sought to block use of the websites 
―www.ratemylego.com‖ and ―www.ratemylegos.com.‖7  Some 
have concluded that ―[t]rademark law . . . often serves as a blunt 
instrument of cultural intimidation and censorship.‖8 
A recent commercial example that involved a tenuous 
trademark claim in which the alleged infringer did not cave has 
been that of Bo Muller-Moore, a folk artist in Vermont who tried 
to trademark the phrase ―Eat More Kale‖ for his T-shirts only to 
find himself facing an attack by Chick-fil-A and its mark ―EAT 
MOR CHIKIN.‖9  The C & D letter that Muller-Moore received 
from the fast food giant accused him of ―trademark infringement, 
dilution, and unfair competition in violation of federal and state 
 
 4 Grinvald, supra note 2, at 650. 
 5 See, e.g., RONALD MICHMAN ET AL., LIFESTYLE MARKETING: REACHING THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSUMER 66–67 (2003) (describing the relationship between customers and 
brands).  
 6 See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1839–40 (2007). 
 7 Id. at 1840–41 (citations omitted).  
 8 DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL 
CULTURE 84 (2005).  
 9 Jess Bidgood, Chicken Chain Says Stop, But T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
5, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/us/eat-more-kale-t-
shirts-challenged-by-chick-fil-a.html. 
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law.‖10  There is no obvious link between chicken and kale, aside 
from the fact that they are both food items.  It is difficult to 
envision a reasonable reading of the Lanham Act that would enable 
Chick-fil-A to claim ownership of all variations of the phrase ―Eat 
More . . .‖  Lest one think that this claim was an isolated incident, 
however, Chick-fil-A has also initiated legal proceedings or sent C 
& D letters to a number of other owners of similar phrases, 
including ones that encouraged individuals to eat more beer, fish, 
goat, burritos, dog, moo, yogurt, ice cream, chocolate, cereal, 
authentic, music, kosher, and treats.
11
  While at times, infringers 
appropriate other elements of a trademark or trade dress in such a 
way as to convey the same source as the original, this does not 
appear to have been the case for Bo Muller-Moore.  The dispute 
between Muller-Moore and Chick-fil-A continues at the time of 
this article, but for every Muller-Moore who receives publicity and 
fights for his rights (by himself or aided by public interest 
organizations), there are innumerable accused individuals who 
quietly disappear. 
At times, the alleged instances of infringement that owners 
choose to pursue are downright strange, such as when the National 
Pork Board (NPB), which owns the slogan ―The Other White 
Meat,‖ went after a product that was actually an April Fool‘s joke.  
The NPB sent a long C & D letter to ThinkGeek over an ad for 
Canned Unicorn Meat because the ad contained the message: ―Pâté 
is passé.  Unicorn—the new white meat.‖12  ThinkGeek remarked 
in a tongue-in-cheek comment: ―We‘d like to publicly apologize to 
the NPB for the confusion over unicorn and pork—and for their 
awkward extended pause on the phone after we had explained our 
unicorn meat doesn‘t actually exist.‖13  While this incident is 
 
 10 Letter of Arnall, Golden, Gregory LLP to Daniel P. Richardson, Oct. 4, 2011, at 2, 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/74942618/Chick-fil-A-2011-C-D-Letter-Over-
Eat-More-Kale. 
 11 Id. at 5. 
 12 See Officially Our Best-Ever Cease and Desist, THINKGEEK (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.thinkgeek.com/blog/2010/06/officially-our-bestever-cease.html. 
 13 Id.  One would think that other elements of the ad, such as the promotion of the meat 
as an ―[e]xcellent source of sparkles‖ would have been a dead give-away. Id.  I would be 
remiss not to further mention the recent C & D letter by one beer manufacturer against 
another for the use of the term HOPASAURUS REX for a beer, to which the alleged 
infringer responded by explaining that it had not sold beer under that name and adding 
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amusing in many ways, it is also indicative of the knee-jerk 
reactions of some trademark owners in the face of the slightest 
perceived infringement.
14
  Indeed, the examples delineated here 
only offer up a taste of the magnitude of the problem, and 
―trademark holders often threaten to sue in cases which—at least in 
the eyes of a person familiar with trademark law—would be 
demonstrably frivolous.‖15  One of the tragic aspects of such 
bullying is that the abuser is safe from punishment for his actions 
because they take place outside of the jurisdiction of the judicial 
system.  Even though the conduct occurs in a private forum, the 
bully is able to use the threat of litigation in a court that will at 
times favor him and exact onerous expenses from the defendant.  
Thus, the potential involvement of the judicial system becomes a 
sword wielded against the victim, while the bully simultaneously 
 
―PS: Please enjoy this drawing of a T-Rex waiving [sic] white flags, which was 
suggested for inclusion by my attorney.  Actually, he‘s just my friend, I can‘t afford his 
legal fees.‖ Best Letter Ever Written to a Lawyer, EDIBLE APPLE (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.edibleapple.com/2012/01/13/best-letter-ever-written-to-a-lawyer/. 
14      Another recent example that shook up the academic world was the C & D letter sent 
by Louis Vuitton to the University of Pennsylvania Law School over the use of a purse-
like pattern on a poster evoking Louis Vuitton‘s purses and advertising the Penn 
Intellectual Property Group Annual Symposium whose subject this year was ―Fashion 
Law.‖ See Michael Pantalony, Letter to Dean Michael A. Fitts, Feb. 29, 2012, available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/lv_letter.pdf (displaying the letter, 
which includes a depiction of the pattern).  The letter argued that the university‘s  
egregious action is not only a serious willful infringement and 
knowingly dilutes the LV Trademarks, but also may mislead others 
into thinking that this type of unlawful activity is somehow ―legal‖ or 
constitutes ―fair use‖ because the Penn Intellectual Property Group is 
sponsoring a seminar on fashion law and ―must be experts.‖ 
Id. at 2.  The University of Pennsylvania argued that the artwork on the poster 
represented a noncommercial parody that neither created confusion nor diluted Louis 
Vuitton‘s mark. Robert F. Firestone, Letter to Michael Pantalony, March 2, 2012, at 1, 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/penn_ogc_letter.pdf.  A 
number of scholars have condemned Louis Vuitton‘s action. See, e.g., Michael Risch, 
Really, Louis Vuitton? Really?, MADISONIAN.NET (March 4, 2012), 
http://networkedblogs.com/uL4R1; Eugene Volokh, Penn Law School Rejects Louis 
Vuitton Nastygram, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 3, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/03/03/ 
penn-law-school-rejects-louis-vuitton-nastygram/.  Not everyone in the legal community, 
however, agrees that Louis Vuitton‘s actions constitute bullying. See Steve Baird, How 
Fashionable is the Louis Vuitton “Trademark Bully” Label?, DUETSBLOG (Mar. 12, 
2012), http://www.duetsblog.com/2012/03/articles/trademarks/how-fashionable-is-the-
louis-vuitton-trademark-bully-label-2/. 
 15 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1840. 
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uses private conduct as a shield to avoid the standards of conduct 
and process that the judicial system imposes. 
Trademark bullying is a touchy problem because the law does 
require owners to police their marks if they want to maintain 
exclusive rights in their marks and prevent so-called 
―genericide.‖16  Any proposal to address the problem of bullying 
therefore has to avoid putting trademark owners into a double-bind 
in which the lines are blurry and both failure to police and 
excessively aggressive policing lead to sanctions or loss of rights.  
This article will outline some of the solutions that have been 
suggested in this context, including legal avenues that may 
theoretically be available to address bullying but ultimately prove 
inadequate, and then propose a new model of dealing with 
trademark bullying that draws on the existing qualities of the PTO 
while trying to circumvent its weaknesses. 
This article will begin by exploring in Part I the existing 
options against trademark bullying, with a particular focus on the 
use of judicial sanctions and extralegal mechanisms such as 
shaming.  Part II will then present an alternative model that 
harnesses the institutional strengths of the PTO and involves the 
filing of C & D letters with the agency.   
I. EXISTING OPTIONS AGAINST TRADEMARK BULLYING 
A.  Judicial Sanctions 
One natural question that arises in the trademark bullying 
context is why, if the behavior of a party or its attorney is 
excessive, we would not use judicial sanctions to eradicate their 
actions.  Judicial sanctions can be imposed via several mechanisms 
 
 16 Scholars have criticized courts‘ approach to genericide and argued that the ―overly 
broad scope of evidence in deeming a trademark generic [ ] forces irrational behaviors on 
the part of mark holders in that they must expend resources trying to persuade the media, 
dictionaries, and others from making fair use of their marks.‖ Desai & Rierson, supra 
note 6, at 1855.  They conclude: ―Thus, mark holders waste resources trying to influence 
actors over whom they have no right or ability to control (through ‗education,‘ bullying, 
and, in some cases, litigation), rather than spending those resources more efficiently 
elsewhere and/or cutting the cost of their goods or services.‖ Id.  
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such as Rule 11,
17
 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
18
 and Section 35 of the 
Lanham Act.
19
  Rule 11 allows district courts to impose penalties 
on either the attorney or the client in a case for pleadings filed for 
an improper purpose, or for frivolous or unsupported legal 
arguments.
20
  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, sanctions are available for 
―unreasonabl[e] and vexatious[]‖ conduct.21  Section 35 of the 
Lanham Act allows for the awarding of attorneys‘ fees to the 
prevailing party in ―exceptional cases.‖22  Courts have traditionally 
defined these as involving bad-faith conduct or willful 
infringement.
23
 
All of these penalties could technically be used to punish 
trademark owners for policing tactics that rise to the level of 
intimidation or harassment, and therefore may constitute a 
potentially beneficial corrective method.  Courts could strategically 
deploy these sanctions against either the attorney or the client, or 
both.
24
  This would allow judges to make factual determinations as 
to whether the harassment was the result of a bullying client or an 
overzealous attorney.  Targeting the best cost avoider
25
 in any 
given situation could optimize the incentive structure of sanctions.  
This would also send a strong message to the trademark owner as 
to what types of behavior will not be tolerated, thereby likely 
slowing down a mark owner‘s attempts to unreasonably expand the 
scope of his mark‘s protection.  Similarly, attorneys would think 
 
 17 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.  
 18 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).  
 19 Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006). 
 20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c).  
 21 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2009). 
 22 Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).  
 23 See, e.g., Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., Ltd., 2012 WL373102, at 
*6 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (citing Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., 127 F.3d 821, 
827 (9th Cir. 1997)).  
 24 In some cases, judges favor joint and several liability between the attorney and the 
client, see Alan E. Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 
901, 906 n.42, although some have proposed otherwise. See, e.g., Karen S. Beck, Note, 
Rule 11 and Its Effects on Attorney/Client Relations, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 916 (1992) 
(arguing that courts should hear evidence and then determine what party should bear the 
loss).  I would like to thank Cassandra Robertson for the conversation that we had on this 
subject. 
 25 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 174–75 (1970) (defining the concept). 
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twice before sending aggressive C & D letters on behalf of their 
clients. 
While such sanctions could prove helpful against bullying in 
some situations, they also entail serious disadvantages for small 
business owners or individuals under attack by trademark bullies.  
First, the key leverage that a trademark bully holds over her 
victims is the disparity in finances that often gives her the upper 
hand.
26
  Litigation can be prohibitively expensive for victims, and 
the costs of litigation alone can be enough to bankrupt a small 
business even if it ultimately prevails.
27
  To make a motion for 
judicial sanctions and obtain relief, the victim would have to 
engage in litigation with the trademark bully; judicial sanctions 
cannot be imposed outside of the litigation process, which is where 
the majority of bullying takes place.
28
  In addition, judicial 
sanctions have rarely been granted in trademark actions.  When 
they have been granted, the threshold for bad faith has been very 
high, and the standards have been all but ―bright-line.‖29  There 
also exists the non-negligible risk that the bully will appeal the 
sanctions and succeed in having an appellate court overrule the 
district court‘s ruling.30 
 
 26 Grinvald, supra note 2, at 656–57.  
 27 Id. at 653.  
 28 Courts can, at times, sanction extra-legal conduct under their inherent power, but it 
is still conduct that occurs in the general context of litigation. Danielle Kie Hart, Happy 
(?) Birthday Rule 11: And the Chill Goes on—Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs Beware: 
Rule 11 Vis-à-vis 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
645, 654–55 (2004). 
 29 See, e.g., Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1159–60 (7th Cir. 
1994) (defining ―exceptional cases‖ as involving truly egregious, purposeful 
infringement, or other purposeful wrongdoing); Aromatique Inc. v. Gold Seal Inc., 28 
F.3d 863, 875–79 (8th Cir. 1994) (defining ―exceptional cases‖ as ones in which the 
action was groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith); Cent. Mfg. Co. 
v. Pure Fishing, Inc., 2005 WL 3090988, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (imposing sanctions 
and noting that Leo Stoller had been ordered to pay attorneys‘ fees in at least seven cases 
and had been involved in forty-nine cases in the Northern District of Illinois at that 
point).  Leo Stoller was eventually banned from filing any actions in the Northern District 
of Illinois. Stoller v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., No. 10 C 2028 (N.D. Ill. 2010), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/31292372/U-S-DISTRICT-COURT-BANS-
LEO-STOLLER. 
 30 For instance, the Second Circuit overturned an award of Rule 11 sanctions against a 
party even though the party and its counsel had made factual representations and legal 
arguments that lacked a reasonable basis. Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 
387–93 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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A further complication arises in this context from the fact that 
courts are split as to the proper standard to apply to Rule 11 and 
Section 1927 sanctions.  Some courts employ a ―bad faith‖ 
standard, akin to contempt of court, which sets a very high 
threshold and eliminates liability for careless or negligent 
conduct.
31
  This high threshold could give an incentive to attorneys 
not to make bona fide efforts to verify their claims, evidence, and 
so on.
32
  Some courts, however, maintain a standard that requires 
―objective unreasonableness.‖33  While this lower standard gives 
courts greater latitude in making factual inquiries into negligent 
conduct, critics have argued that it leaves attorneys vulnerable to 
liability for good-faith errors, misrepresentations by clients, and 
arbitrary interpretation by the judiciary.
34
 
Further diluting the power of Rule 11 sanctions is its ―safe 
harbor‖ provision requiring that before an attorney can move for 
sanctions, he must make a motion to opposing counsel, without 
alerting the court, and provide twenty-one days for the offender to 
correct her conduct before the court is notified.
35
  While this 
provision is touted as a method of easing the court‘s burden by 
allowing attorneys to self-police, the disadvantages of the 
provision are apparent.  Because of the confusion surrounding 
sanctionable conduct, attorneys may be hesitant or unable to 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behavior and to 
take the appropriate action.
36
  Attorneys sometimes additionally 
 
 31 See Hart, supra note 28, at 653.  
 32 See Sybil Dunlop, Note, Are an Empty Head and a Pure Heart Enough? Mens Rea 
Standards for Judge-Imposed Rule 11 Sanctions and their Effects on Attorney Action, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 615, 626 (2008).   
 33 Id. at 629–31.  
 34 Id. at 635–38.  For a more general discussion of reasonableness as a legal standard, 
see, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323 
(2012). 
 35 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2).  In some situations, courts have also implemented Rule 11 
sanctions sua sponte.  For a discussion of sua sponte sanctions, see, e.g., Lucas v. 
Duncan, 574 F.3d 772, 775–81 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at 
Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1007, 1035–36 (1999) (concluding that sua sponte 
―rulings represent a small number of decisions relative to the number of decisions in 
which courts have considered motions filed by a party.‖).  
 36 See Dunlop, supra note 32, at 644–45; see also John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian 
Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275, 326 (1999) (discussing generally the benefits of 
objective standards of behavior). 
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fail to report sanctionable behavior because they are afraid of 
reprisal or because they have a tacit agreement with the opposing 
counsel to look the other way.
37
  Genuine concerns also exist that 
without the court‘s oversight, attorneys will be able to use sanction 
motions as a method to delay the litigation process or as a threat to 
―bully an opponent into withdrawing a paper or position.‖38 
Another avenue of recourse against trademark bullies that has 
received some attention is the use of anti-SLAPP (Strategic 
Lawsuit Against Public Participation) regulations.
39
  These 
regulations, which currently only exist at the state level, seek to 
protect the rights to free speech and to democratic participation 
against lawsuits that try to undercut such activities by forcing 
defendants to spend large amounts of money on litigation.
40
  Anti-
SLAPP regulations allow defendants to expedite the litigation 
process and to potentially recover their litigation costs from 
plaintiffs.
41
  The quintessential SLAPP against which such 
regulations are supposed to protect has little or no likelihood of 
succeeding in court and tries ―to interfere with the protected free 
expression of defendants.‖42 
Anti-SLAPP regulations would provide trademark defendants 
with access to courts at a lower cost and with a way to recover 
their costs from the plaintiff.  At this time, however, they only 
form a part of state, not federal law, and they are not available in 
all fifty states.
43
  Even in the states where they do exist, they can 
currently only be used in federal court for cases decided under 
diversity jurisdiction
44
 rather than for claims under federal law
45
 
 
 37 See Dunlop, supra note 32, at 644–45. 
 38 GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES, AND 
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 14 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004). 
 39 See Eric Goldman, Why I Support HR 4364, the Proposed Federal Anti-SLAPP Bill, 
ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2010, 9:43 AM), http://blog.eric 
goldman.org/archives/2010/03/hr_4364.htm. 
 40 See, e.g., FAQs About SLAPPs, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-
slapp.org/slappdash-faqs-about-slapps/ (last accessed Jan. 28, 2012).  
 41 See Goldman, supra note 39. 
 42 See, e.g., Tom Wyrwich, A Cure for a “Public Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-
SLAPP Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663, 664 (2011) (citations omitted).  
 43 Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1685 n.195 (2011) 
(putting the number at a bit more than half of all states) (citation omitted). 
 44 See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970–73 
(9th Cir. 1999) (applying California‘s anti-SLAPP statute in a diversity case). 
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(of which trademarks are a part).  Additionally, a trademark bully 
faced with anti-SLAPP regulations would still have the opportunity 
to appeal his case and try to use the judicial system to cause the 
defendant hardship.  Several changes would need to take place to 
increase the ability of judicial sanctions to combat trademark 
bullying.  First, the standard for sanctions would require 
clarification so that the recipients of C & D letters could better 
evaluate their chances during litigation.  Second, the courts would 
need to moderate their current policies that favor trademark owners 
and are rooted in the perceived obligation that owners have to 
aggressively police their marks.
46
  An excessively blurry line 
between forceful but legitimate enforcement and bullying is bound 
to render judicial sanctions ineffective.  Third, courts would have 
to broaden their analysis to lend greater weight to bad-faith 
conduct that takes place prior to litigation, such as improper C & D 
letters and extortionist settlement demands.  Because these 
sanctions currently focus on conduct during litigation, the victim 
must initiate court proceedings to gain redress.  It is easy for 
bullies to intimidate victims in the private sphere, where a 
significant proportion of bullying occurs.   
Recognizing that illegitimate actions generally take place 
before litigation and acknowledging that trademark owners will at 
times minimize record-keeping of their improper enforcement 
attempts would represent an important step in protecting the 
victims of bullying.
47
  Such a change could potentially also include 
shifting the target of sanctions from the attorney to the client if it is 
the client that is primarily responsible for initiating the excessive 
enforcement attempts.  Finally, the legislature could play a role by 
removing the ―safe harbor‖ provision of Rule 11 and either 
clarifying the intended use of sanctions or specifying the mens rea 
required under the law.
48
  Some legislative proposals have 
 
 45 Ginx, Inc. v. Soho Alliance, 720 F. Supp. 2d 342, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (―No federal 
court of which [the court is] aware has ever awarded anti-SLAPP sanctions because of a 
federal claim in a federal forum.‖). 
 46 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1835. 
 47 William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1547, 1569 (2006). 
 48 STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 10–19 (1989) (stating that courts 
disagree on the proper standard). 
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attempted to make changes to Rule 11, but none has been enacted 
yet.
49
 
Ultimately, while these changes could benefit the victims of 
trademark bullying, their costs may be too high to warrant 
implementation.  Lowering the threshold for judicial sanctions may 
conflict with the greater legal policy of zealous representation of 
clients.
50
  Barring a tectonic shift in trademark law and an 
unprecedented clarification of the standards for proper mark 
policing, attorneys could find themselves in difficult positions and 
be subject to disciplinary measures either for aggressive 
representation or, alternatively, for deficient representation if rights 
to a mark are eventually lost as a result of genericide.
51
  Changing 
the focus of sanctions from attorneys to clients is problematic as 
well.  After all, clients are presumed to lack sophistication in legal 
matters and to rely on their attorneys for advice.  Attorneys rather 
than clients are generally in the best position to assess whether 
enforcement conduct is likely to be improper and to advise 
accordingly.  Attorneys also have to make decisions during trials 
that do not always allow for extensive conferrals with clients, so it 
would add numerous complications to sanction clients or apportion 
blame precisely between attorneys and clients.  Hence, even if the 
political and judicial wills were sufficient to impose changes in the 
realm of judicial sanctions, the undesirable consequences are of 
sufficient magnitude that they should give us pause and encourage 
consideration of other alternatives. 
B. Extralegal Measures 
With the proliferation of social media on the Internet, the 
victims of bullying have obtained increased access to resources 
and can fight bullying without resorting to legal measures.  One 
 
 49 See, e.g., Ann M. Odelson & Timothy B. Parlin, Proposal to Amend Rule 11 
Introduced in Congress, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 2011, available at http://www.newyork 
lawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202513143784&slreturn=1 (describing recent 
proposals to eliminate the safe harbor and make other changes).  
 50 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated, 46 FLA. L. REV. 127, 131 
(1994) (discussing the need to protect attorneys‘ ability to engage in zealous advocacy 
when policymakers determine the rules for sanctions). 
 51 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1794–97 (describing the pressure on practitioners 
to aggressively protect marks based on the tremendous value that marks can have, and the 
legal implications that can arise from failing to protect a brand).  
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tool to combat bullies in this context has been the use of social 
media to make bullies‘ behavior the subject of public criticism and 
to shame them into ceasing their activities.  Shaming can prove 
helpful in the trademark context because the costs of shaming are 
minimal while the punitive effects can have a lasting impact.  
Trademark owners generally rely on their public reputations for 
commercial success, and thus a shaming campaign exposing an 
owner as a bully can have significant repercussions for the owner‘s 
business.  There are numerous stories in which individuals or small 
businesses were able to triumph over giant corporations this way.
52
  
The threshold for shaming is also much lower than it is for judicial 
sanctions, and the task is fairly clear: the victim has to convince 
the public that the bully has violated social and legal norms 
through his behavior.
53
 
Shaming, however, is not without its downsides.  Its effect 
could suffer dilution through overuse if some parties try to employ 
it excessively and in an illegitimate manner.  Because shaming is 
essentially a private form of conduct that is unregulated by the 
courts or similar entities, there is no consistent way to prevent 
abusers of the technique from weakening its power.
54
  Shaming 
also still requires the victim to respond to the bully in a negative 
manner, which may invoke litigation from the bully who expects 
capitulation rather than resistance.  Furthermore, shamers could 
face defamation lawsuits.
55
  The situation could escape the victim‘s 
control as the public or the media run away with a controversy.  A 
negative impact against the victim could result if she has reached 
an agreement with the bully and is seeking to withdraw from or 
end the shaming campaign. 
Some mechanisms could improve the effectiveness and smooth 
functioning of shaming in this context.  For instance, we could 
 
 52 For example, Rock Art Brewery successfully used Internet shaming against the 
multi-million dollar company Hansen Beverage when the latter started a C & D campaign 
regarding use of the term ―Vermonster‖ in the context of beer sales. See Grinvald, supra 
note 2, at 671–74.  
 53 Id. at 670–72; see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 591, 636 (1996) (explaining that shaming serves to ―denounce the wrong 
doer and his conduct as contrary to shared moral norms‖). 
 54 See Grinvald, supra note 2, at 680–81. 
 55 Id. at 682–83. 
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make greater use of websites that monitor the veracity of shaming 
claims and could thus hopefully weed out a portion of abusers.  
Such websites could also serve as a centralized sounding board for 
dispute resolution such that once the parties have resolved their 
conflict and the victim wishes to cease its public campaign, the 
website can alert the public to the resolution, which might then 
discontinue the shaming.  While the use of online tools can serve a 
critical role in providing information to victims
56
 and giving them 
access to retaliatory measures, the bullies are often so powerful 
that the effect may not prove strong enough.  In some cases, 
victims may also not be aware of the resources that exist for their 
protection and could cave before even making efforts to retaliate. 
II. THE ALTERNATIVE OF A PTO PARADIGM 
The time may be ripe to consider adopting an altogether 
different model to combat trademark bullying.  I will sketch here a 
proposal that tries to alleviate the problem of bullying and 
simultaneously maintain procedural safeguards as well as enable 
mark owners to properly police their marks.  The idea would be to 
create a new mechanism through the PTO that would balance the 
large company‘s duty to police and the individual‘s or small 
business‘ right to compete without unfair harassment.  The PTO 
could offer an oversight process that would allow agency attorneys 
to review C & D letters and issue rulings on the merits of the 
alleged infringement.
57
  This would benefit both the trademark 
owner and the potential bullying victim.  The initial requirement 
would be the filing of the C & D letter with the PTO.  The primary 
purpose of that requirement is to impose some cost on the 
trademark owner to incentivize him to make careful choices as to 
when to attempt to enforce his mark. 
 
 56 This is a key function of the Chilling Effects website, but its existence has certainly 
not extinguished trademark bullying. See CHILLING EFFECTS, http://chillingeffects.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012).  
 57 This model contains some parallels to my previous work, in particular to a proposal 
to consider using judges to clear trademark infringement surveys before they are 
conducted. See generally Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the 
Content and Procedural Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027 (2007). 
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The process would begin by having the mark owner file the 
letter, along with a fee determined by the PTO.  The fee would 
have to cover the operating expenses of this mechanism and 
therefore would likely be more than simply nominal.  The 
trademark owner would also have the option of filing additional 
supporting evidence.  The documentation would then be sent to the 
alleged infringer, who would have the opportunity to respond.  A 
PTO attorney would analyze the alleged infringement and 
determine whether legal action by the trademark owner would 
have merit. 
If the PTO decides that infringement took place, the trademark 
owner could proceed either with private settlement negotiations or 
he could pursue litigation.  Similar to how trademark registrations 
carry a presumption of validity,
58
 the declaration by the PTO 
would be treated as a presumption of infringement by courts.  
Further, if he is ultimately successful, part of the trademark 
owner‘s recovery could include his PTO filing fees, thus negating 
possible chilling effects that the costs might have on valid 
enforcement actions.  If the PTO determines that the accusation is 
unfounded, the victim could use this to establish a presumption of 
improper conduct in court if further enforcement tactics are 
employed.  This may lower the uncertainty otherwise provided by 
litigation and partially alleviate the burden to ―litigate or 
capitulate‖ that defendants currently face. 
Trademark owners could continue to send C & D letters 
without following the PTO procedure.  The way I envision the 
system is that there would exist a threshold value of a mark above 
which certain requirements would kick in for owners when they 
send a letter directly to an alleged infringer.
59
  Mark owners would 
 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006). 
 59 One could object that mark owners might have an incentive to fudge the valuations 
of their marks down the line if there was a dispute as to whether they are obligated to 
meet the new requirements of PTO filings.  The fact that the recovery of damages is 
directly tied to mark value, however, would provide them with a strong disincentive from 
doing so, especially because they would have difficulty providing inconsistent figures 
across different lawsuits without being accused of bad faith should they actually be 
tempted to do so.  For a discussion of how the value of brands is determined, see, James 
T. Berger & Diana Tadzijeva, Marketing Perspectives on Brand Valuation, 
JAMESBERGER.NET, http://www.jamesberger.net/Brand_Valuation_Methods.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2012).  
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have to add a boilerplate statement indicating that they are or are 
not also filing the letter with the PTO, and cite the relevant statutes 
and regulations that cover the practice.  With these rules in place, 
there are three possible scenarios.  First, the owner may fail to 
include the statement.  In that case, the letter would not count later 
if courts ever examine whether the owner properly policed his 
mark.  If he sues the person to whom he sent the letter, his failure 
to include the statement would also be construed during litigation 
as bad faith on his part.
60
  Second, the owner could state that he is 
additionally filing the letter with the PTO.  This would qualify as 
evidence of policing and serve as an information-forcing 
mechanism to show his good faith about his legal claims.  The 
recipient would be on notice and know to take this type of letter 
seriously.  Third, the owner could state that he is not filing the 
letter with the PTO.  If that is the case, the letter will not qualify as 
evidence of policing down the line.  The recipient of the letter may 
be less intimidated and could decide to force a conflict if he feels 
that he is in the right and the senior user is less than serious about 
his claims.  Owners of less valuable marks would not be required 
to file the letter with the PTO (although they would have the option 
of doing so) and/or make related statements in C & D letters 
because imposing the costs on such owners to go through the PTO 
may be excessive, and bullying concerns are already reduced with 
these types of parties. 
Trademark owners would receive additional benefits beyond 
the power of a determination of validity from the PTO procedure.  
A significant amount of trademark bullying stems from bullies‘ 
impression that to maintain a mark, it is the owner‘s duty to 
aggressively police it.  Thus, many bullying situations involve 
mark owners who have taken this perceived duty to extreme 
 
60  Similarly, placing phone calls that constitute the substantive equivalents of C & D 
letters would be construed as bad faith if litigation does proceed.  Some attorneys 
currently advise their clients to use the phone precisely because it avoids the creation of a 
record. See, e.g., Geri Haight, Trademark Enforcement, Trademark “Bullies” and Social 
Media, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK MATTERS (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.copyrighttrademarkmatters.com/2011/12/05/trademark-enforcementtrade 
mark-bullies-and-social-media/ (―When in doubt, pick up the phone.  A one-on-one 
conversation may be an effective way to resolve the issue amicably—without creating a 
paper trail.‖). 
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levels.
61
  By permitting the filing of C & D letters to serve as 
evidence of policing the mark, the trademark owner will be 
relieved of that burden and hopefully incentivized to make more 
careful decisions as to when to pursue enforcement actions.   
One of the key advantages of the PTO regulation system will 
be the reduction of private trademark bullying, as the mark owner 
will most likely review the merits of an enforcement action before 
incurring the costs of filing a C & D letter.  If he is pursuing a 
legitimate claim, the owner will likely recover those costs later and 
receive other procedural benefits from having filed the letter.  The 
recipients of C & D letters would receive protection through the 
oversight of the PTO and the disincentives against bullying that the 
new system would provide.  Recipients would also be able to 
perform a search of pre-existing PTO decisions if the agency 
places them online like it does trademark registrations.
62
  The 
average alleged infringer will likely find that these records are 
easier to search and understand than the results he is likely to 
obtain by searching judicial decisions in databases such as 
Westlaw, LexisNexis, or PACER, not to mention much more 
inexpensive to gather.
63
 
This proposal certainly contains drawbacks as well.  There 
would be significant administrative and set-up costs, which could 
result in filing fees high enough to reduce valid enforcement 
attempts.  In addition, the program would require effective 
enforcement by the courts and the PTO.  If a PTO determination 
represents a near-certain victory for a trademark owner, his 
settlement demands could become unreasonable and force the 
alleged infringer to accept litigation as the only means of 
protection.  Critics may also argue that the PTO will essentially be 
required to act as a court and that it will be forced to hire more 
 
 61 For example, Warner Brothers was embarrassed to find out that it had sent a letter to 
a 15-year-old girl demanding that she take down her Harry Potter fan site. Kieren 
McCarthy, Warner Bros Backs Down on Harry Potter Web Site, THE REGISTER (Dec. 15, 
2000), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/12/15/warner_bros_backs_down/. 
 62 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Trademark Electronic Search System 
(TESS), USPTO.GOV, http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4002:v0fmtn.1.1 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2012).  
 63 Id.  The TESS system is free to use (meaning that it is agency-funded, but the cost to 
the agency of this new task would likely be trivial). 
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attorneys to undertake this work.  These additional salaries would 
further increase the filing fees and could have a chilling effect on 
some legitimate claims.  At the same time, the PTO already 
conducts likelihood of confusion analyses as part of the trademark 
registration process and is thus just as equipped to handle this task 
as that of registration.
64
  The additional costs should not prove 
insurmountable and the current registration system should not be 
unduly burdened. 
Trademark owners may also argue that imposing PTO 
regulation on the enforcement process will in effect impose further 
costs for owners aside from the filing fees.  The mark owners may 
claim that instead of merely issuing C & D letters, which are 
relatively inexpensive to prepare, owners will now have to engage 
their lawyers in costly in-depth infringement analyses, in the face 
of somewhat undefined case law.  These cost impositions, 
however, would most likely not be prohibitive and in fact comport 
with general trademark policy.  As PTO decisions on C & D letters 
are issued, these rulings will provide information as to how owners 
should interpret trademark law and, as indicated above, will 
potentially be easier to interpret than court decisions on the 
subject.  The cost and uncertainty of legitimate enforcement could 
therefore actually decrease.
65
 
 
 64 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the PTO is, as I have previously stated, in need 
of reform to speed up and potentially improve its processing of claims. See generally 
Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381 (2009) (proposing the 
targeted use of private actors to assist in the trademark registration process).  Some critics 
argue that the PTO is not equipped to deal with determining real-world usage and 
infringement and that an entity like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
or National Arbitration Forum (NAF) would be better suited for this task.  While I 
believe that my proposal would provide a sensible integration with the current duties of 
the PTO, these are alternatives worth exploring once more extensive empirical research 
on the issue takes place.  At that stage, part of the focus may also turn toward the possible 
role of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) in any new procedures given the 
TTAB‘s existing involvement in trademark registration opposition proceedings.  I would 
like to thank Eric Goldman and David Silverman for their comments on this subject. 
65  As this article was going to press, a bill entitled ―Small Business Trademark 
Protection Act‖ was introduced into the Minnesota State House with the goal of 
combating trademark bullying, in part through a requirement that all C & D letters 
include language advising recipients of their right to a settlement conference. See Steve 
Baird, Minnesota’s Legislative Answer to “Trademark Bullying”?, DUETSBLOG (Apr. 9, 
2012), http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=1b1e1dda-5c6f-4285-
9254-25d2c757c105.  While my proposal is ultimately quite different from that in this 
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CONCLUSION 
The problem of trademark bullying is tricky but perhaps not 
entirely intractable.  This area of the law remains an outlier in the 
sense that we do not normally expect such a high level of assertive 
policing and initiation of legal actions for owners to maintain their 
rights as we do for trademarks.  Changes in the implementation of 
judicial sanctions and mechanisms such as shaming could alleviate 
some of the problems associated with bullying, but are likely to 
leave significant gaps.  Public interest organizations will perhaps 
increase their outreach and provide greater legal representation to 
the victims of bullying, although this would require focused 
attention and financial resources.  This article proposes a new 
paradigm to handle the tension between allowing owners to police 
their marks and preventing them from harassing competitors and 
silencing speech.  While substantive changes in the law will 
hopefully clarify the line between legitimate and improper 
enforcement, the time may have come to consider new procedural 
safeguards as well.  The proposal delineated here certainly requires 
significant further research before its final implementation, 
including detailed empirical study of the financial costs and 
benefits.  My goal was to advance the conversation by offering 
another possible instrument in the toolbox at our disposal to fix a 
system in need of more than just tinkering. 
 
bill, the idea to require specific language in C & D letters and involve administrative 
actors into the pre-litigation process mirror some of the notions presented in this article. 
See id. 
